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Until recently, theorists of trade and welfare have, by and large, ignored the ever-increasing literature on project evaluation. This is puzzling since the bulk of the project evaluation literature attempts to derive shadow prices to replace the market prices that, in distorted situations, clearlv will not reflect true opportunity costs whereas the major advances in the welfare theory of international trade have consisted precisely in the analysis of issues in trade and welfare when the market is characterized by a number of alternative endogenous or policy-imposed distortions.
The only attempts to date by international economists in the direction of project evaluation of a sort were by the proponents of the socalled DRC 2 (domestic resource cost) and ERP (effective rate of protection) measures.
The question principally addressed by these proponents was the following:
if the DRC's (or ERP's) were calculated for a distorted situation with tariffs and the current and potential industries/projects were ranked in terms thereof, would this enable one to infer that, in the non-distorted optimal situation, the industries with lower DRC's would expand while those with higher DRC's would contract? As is now well-understood, the answer to this question is in the negative. For example, Findlay (1971) , using a 1 Cf. Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) ; Johnson (1965) ; Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1969) ; Bhagwati (1971) ; and the numerous writings of Kemp, Findlay, Corden, Magee, Brecher and several trade theorists. 2 In the absence of distortions, ranking of projects/activities by these measures obviously reduces to the same thing. This is because ERP"= DVA-FVA FVA and DRC= DVA where DVA is value added at domestic prices and FVA is value ad- FVA. ded at international prices, so that ERP=(DRC-1).
In terms of the conceptual distinctions introduded in Section II later, we should state that the DRC in this argument is defined as DRC . i Â -17)r^9^i<3 model of a small country with two final goods and two intermediates used in fixed proportions in the final goods, and with all tradeables, has demonstrated precisely that the optimal free trade solution may bring into production an industry which is characterized by the highest DRC in the distorted situation while eliminating an industry characterized by a lower HRC in the distorted situation. Little-Mirrlees (1969) language, "border" prices for commodities, but use actual market prices for factors] will not provide the correct pricing valuation, nor will alternative measures that have been proposed and/or are used in practice.
As our departure point, we take the simple model of trade theory, with primary factors producing traded goods (including the project output), with no intermediates and with fixed international prices for the goods. This is also the model deployed by Findlay and Wellisz (1976) Earlier analyses by Joshi (1972) , Lai (1974) and Corden (1974) should also be mentioned. Findlay-Wellisz (1976, p. 545) is "an inherently second best one" in which "the criterion for acceptance of the project is whether or not it will increase the value of total production at world prices as compared with the existing situation, assuming that the distortional policy on the existing goods continues unchanged." 1 Provided that inferior goods are ruled out, there is of course a monotonic relationship between welfare and the distance of the availability locus (at international prices) from the origin. Hence, we can disregard, without error, the fact that tariffs and/or trade subsidies will distort consumption as well as production.
In applying this criterion for a "small" project, we note first that the introduction of the project will use labour and/or capital that are withdrawn from their present use. As such, the answer to the question whether or not the project (producing X_) will increase the value of production at world prices is the same as to the question whether the world price of a unit of output of the project exceeds or falls short of its cost of production as obtained by evaluating the labour and capital used in producing X-at their shadow prices i.e. at prices that equal their marginal contribution in their existing use to the value of total production at world prices.
Turn now to Figure (1) . AB is the production possibility curve, defined on commodities X^and X" . At free trade, production would be at * * * P (X^,X _) reflecting the international commodity prices. However, with trade distortion, the commodity price-ratio is more favourable to commodity X" and production is at P(X^,X"). Now, the planner is assumed unable to correct the situation directly, so that the commodity price-ratio, the factor price-ratio and factor proportions for X^and X" are to be held fixed at their respective values at P(X^,X2). Denote then the corresponding input coefficients as (k^.J^) and (^2'i2^^^'^factor rentals as w and r. Now, as noted above, the second-best shadow prices of labour (w*) and capital (y*) in this situation must equal the change in the quantities of * * X^and X" output, evaluated at international prices p^a nd p" , resulting from a marginal change in labour and capital respectively, starting at P(X^,X") and maintaining the distorted commodity price-ratio for production decisions. Thus, defining W=p^X^+ P2 X2 and the total availability of The notation w* , "y* is used here because the 'hat' refers to the distorted situation and the 'star' to the evaluation of output change at international prices. ues for w and y will obtain only when the international price-ratio is in This is, in fact, the procedure suggested for deriving shadow factor prices by Diamond and Mirrlees (1976) In their derivation of shadow factor prices for the above problem, however, Findlay-Wellisz (1976) I-5d) This is the dual to the following primal:
Cf. Bhagwati (1958); Johnson (1967) who deals with the precise distortion in our model here; and Bhagwati (1971) who states the general theory of immiserizing growth that explains and ties together the different instances of immiserizing growth.
As such, the Findlay-Wellisz procedure amounts to (cf. Figure 2 ) deriving the shadow factor prices corresponding to the international prices but subject to a "feasible" production possibility curve defined by A'PB*. These Findlay-Wellisz shadow prices, (w ,y ) , are clearly yielded by putting the international price-ratio tangent to A'PB', in the usual way, and are illustrated to advantage in Figure ( Figure 2 at B' (on X ) or A' (on X") : but this would be the correct shadow factor price-ratio only if the initial distorted situation were at B' or A' respectively, instead of at P as initially hypothesised for the problem at hand I The Findlay-Wellisz procedure is therefore critically inappropriate to the problem at hand.
To put the same point in another way, the Findlay-Wellisz nrocedure could be made accurate, i.e. the basic flaw just stated could be eliminated, if we were to assume that if the possibility of negative shadow price for a factor were parametrically present, that factor would be "thrown away" directly . This would be tantamount to saying, in Figure 2 , that if the international price-ratio led to specialization at B'(on X^), and hence implied a zero Findlay-Wellisz shadow price for labour (w /y "^l) II:
ERP's, DRC's et. al.
We have thus deduced, in the preceding section, the precise shadow prices that must be used, in a distorted situation, for prolect appraisal.
We are therefore now in a position to cast light on the inconclusive and confusing debate among the ERP and DRC proponents-as typified, for example, by the controversy in the Journal of Political Economy among Bruno (19 72), Krueger (1972) and Balassa-Schydlowsky (1968) , (1972) 
Now, noting that the DRC concept implies that one is measuring the domestic resources used in an activity to produce a unit of foreign exchange, we can distinguish sharply among the following, alternative concepts that correspond, in one way or another, to the concepts that are often apparently used indistinguishably in the literature.
Note, initially, that by first-best we will refer to factor valuations, A * * * * (w ,Y ) , corresponding to the first-best optimal situation at P (X ,X ) iF igure 1. By second-best, we will denote instead the factor valuations, (w , Y ) that reflect the second-best optimal situation, given the distortion.
Finally, by "private", we will denote the factor valuations, (w,Y) , that actually obtain in the distorted situation at P.
Next, we should also note that the debate includes additionally a distinction between "direct plus indirect" versus only direct primary factors.
Hence, we will distinguish between "total" measures which refer to gross is assumed to be free from distortion.
cepted by our (correctly-derived) criterion, it will also be accepted if we were instead to compute the ERP or DRC for it and for the existing activities and then rank it correspondingly vis-a-vis these other activities.
In short, would the ERP, and the DRC, be less for an acceptable project (X ) than for the existing activities (X^and X")?
To answer this question, note first the fact that, for the existing activities (X and X ) at first-best or second-best shadow factor prices, the DRC's must necessarily be unity. For an interesting analysis of the problem as to when a project accepted (rejected) by the incorrect use of first-best factor prices would be rejected (accepted) by the correct use of second-best factor prices, see Findlay-Wellisz (1976) .
Note however that this analysis is based on their inappropriate procedure for deriving second-best factor prices and therefore should be correspondingly recast. It is also evident that it makes absolutely no difference whether one takes total or direct DRC measures, as long as second-best shadow prices are used for project appraisal as indeed they ought to be when the initial 2 distorted situation has to be taken as given.
If, on the other hand, the total DRC measure is used in the absence of second-best shadow prices, e.g. the private measure DRC , this will clearly be inappropriate. But then so will the direct DRC measure, DRC , and 3 hence ERP. Balassa and Schydlowsky (1972) contend that, in view of the problem about shadow prices that the DRC proponents have always noted, the ERP measure be replaced by a so-called "social" ERP measure I Quite aside from the fact that it is somewhat strange to hold onto an inappropriate concept by tagging on new prefixes to it, the so-called "social" ERP, to be correct, must be converted into DRC . But this implies revaluing domestic factor inputs directly at the second-best shadow prices in the numerator whereas the essence of the ERP approach surely is to arrive at the numerator indirectly as the difference between the values of outputs and inputs. Clearly, it is therefore strange to call ORC^, a "social" ERP unless one's Intention is to retrieve oneself from an error at the price of being peculiar.
This would also seem to contradict the Balassa-Schydlowsky (1972) assertion that the total measures yield incorrect conclusions while the direct measures do not.
If the fabric industry (X ) is protected, then the appraisal of a fabric project (X_) will be generally erroneous whether one uses the total measure DRCyj-j-j. or the ERP. Thus, the assertion that merely taking the last-stage fabric project by itself and evaluating the garment input at its international price would be enough, i.e. that ERP (or its equivalent, DRCjj^) would be correct, is false and ignores the fact that the tariff (subsidy) on the garment requires that second-best shadow prices for factors have to be correctly derived and used. And, as argued immediately earlier, if such second-best shadow prices are used, it is irrelevant whether one uses total or direct measures anyway. Bhagwati and Desai (1970) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975) for India and Bhagwati (1977) for more extended discussion of such rules and the associated policies of "automatic" protection.
2
In this evaluation, therefore, the fabrics would again enter the calculntion at international prices. This distortion was brought into analytical discussion by Harris and Todaro (1970) ; the "sector-specificity" and its critical importance, were noted and analyzed in Bhagwati and Srinlvasan (197A) and in Srinlvasan and Bhagwati (1975) . This is the distortion where the sticky, actual wage exceeds the shadow wage but the sticky wage applies universally across sectors. The major papers on this distortion, initially analyzed by Haberler (1950) , are by Lefeber (1971) and Brecher (1974a Brecher ( ) (1974b .
Among the principal positive analyses of the distortion when the same factor must be paid for differentially by different sectors are those by Hagen (1958) , , Bhagwatl-Srlnivasan (1971) , Jones (1971) and Magee (1976) ; the welfare analyses are by Hagen (1971) and Bhagwati-Ramaswaml (1963) .
The model as set out in Harris-Todaro (1970) is mlsspecifled on the demand side. See therefore the correct specification, as set out in BhagwatlSrlnivasan (1974) and followed here.
Assuming perfect competition and the production functions in the two sectors to be strictly concave functions of employment, and denoting the latter by F and F and the international pric2-ratio as p^/ p" as before, we can now write tlie Harris-Todaro equilibrium as:
Since the availability of foreign exchange in this model is given by .F~^2^-*^»^^^s econd-best shadow price of labour is clearly:
With F'' <0 by strict concavity of F >^^d L >L , we then see that the secondbest shadow wage for labour is less than the agricultural wage which, in turn, is less than the manufacturing wage. Note also that the shadow wage is positive, instead of zero, despite the unemployed labour; this is because any withdrawal of labour from the labour force (L) , while initially reducing unemployment, will simultaneously raise the expected wage in manufacturing and hence result in reduction of agricultural employment and output. Shift now to the model where the wage is sticky across the two sectors (' at the level w . Assuming then that commodity X" is capital-intensive l^'e-7-> ;-B, we now get;
where V F F and P" are tV>p partial derivitives w.r.t. K and L respectively, i.e. they are marginal products of capital and labour; and F"/L" and F /L are the average products of labour in production of X and X respectively.
We can then see that, in terms of Figure 4 , the production possibility curve is APB, P representing the point at which rF" K"^k] h J the minimum wage constraint, the feasible production possibility curve will be APO where PQ is the Rybczynski line (for variations in labour) and, at points on PQ other than P, there is unemployed labour. Let the capitallabour ratios at P then be K_/L" and K /L . * * Now, when the international price-ratio p /p yields tangency along AP, the market and shadow wages will be naturally identical, and will exceed w if the tangency is off P. For the price-ratio tangent to APB at P, the production equilibrium however may be anywhere between P and Q, the different production equilibria implying different labour availabilities. Therefore, for this tangential price-ratio, the shadow and actual wages will be w for production at P, whereas the actual wage will be w but the shadow wage will Finally, for all commodity priceratios steeper than the price-ratio tangent at P, there will be complete specialization on X at Q and the corresponding actual wage will be w while 2 the shadow wage will be zero.
Hence, unlike in the sector-specific wage stickiness case, the unemployment of labour can "indeed be taken to imply a zero shadow wage for labour.
However, associated with this, the shadow rental of capital will exceed its market rental: so that the standard prescription of putting the wage of unemployed labour equal to zero but using the market rental of capital is erroneous.
C:
The Wage-Differential Case Take finally the distortion where the wage in X" is a multiple A of that in X .
In this case, it is well known that the production possibility curve will shrink to AQB, in Figure 5 . Furthermore, AQB need not be concave to the origin, the market equilibrium need not be unique for any commodity price-ratio, and the commodity price-ratio will not equal the marginal rate 3 of transformation along AQB.
Let the market equilibrium in the initial, distorted situation be at Q.
Then, we can derive the two Rybczynski lines, QB' (for variations in labour availability) and QA' (for variations in capital availability), assuming as earlier that X" is capital-intensive. Now, the international price-ratio equals the ratio of marginal products
At points other than P on PQ, furthermore, the shadow rental of capital will be the average product of capital in X_ at P along the curve APB, higher than its market value which will equal the marginal product.
2 At Q also, the shadow price of capital will continue to be the average product of capital in manufacturing at point P, since at Q only the manufactured good, X-, is produced using all the available capital and the same techniaue as at P.
Figure (5) of capital in producing X and X with the techniques corresponding to Q Jones (1971) calls the differential-weighted intensities the "value" as against the Samuelsonian "physical" factor-intensities. for the distortions that we have examined, the criterion of "border-pricing", recommended by Little and Mirrlees (1969) Third, while we have confined our analysis to "small" projects, drawing
Infinitesimal resources away from the existing distorted situation, it is equally clear from our analysis that the results will hold also for "large" projects. Given the Rybczynski-line properties of the different models, the shadow prices of factors will be identical for small and large shifts of factors into the project.
Fourth, we might as well note explicitly that our analysis could be readily extended to models involving non-traded goods; this would permit the introduction of the exchange rate in a meaningful manner into the analysis. On the other hand, the extension to models with many goods and factors, or to 2 sector-specific factors, is not merely readily done; it will introduce no special insights that qualify what has been learnt from the present paper.
"Very large" projects may however take one away from the Rybczynski line and modify, in turn, the shadow prices.
For example, the latter is done readily, using the Jones (1971^) model where each of two sectors has a specific factor. The project (X_) can then be thought of as drawing one or both of these specific factors and/or the mobile, nonspecific factor(s) from the existing, distorted situation.
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Finally, note that we are implicitly assuming that, in respect of projects which will be chosen under shadow prices but not under actual, market prices, the resulting losses are covered in some non-distortionary way. However, if the losses can be covered only by some form of distortionary taxation, then the shadow prices (for both inputs and outputs) have to be calculated reflecting this fact.
It is also clear that implicit in our analysis is the assumption that problems of income distribution and savings can be tackled through the deployment of appropriate non-distortionary instruments.
Obviously, if this is not possible, the shadow prices will have to be calculated afresh by introducing additional constraints which reflect the feasible set of public policy instruments.
> Append ix
We can set up the derivation of shadow prices in the second-best situation as a programming problem as follows. Given the market-determined input coefficients corresponding to the tariff-distorted output prices, choose the output levels X, and X" (denoting both the activities and their levels by the same symbols) in such a way as to maximize the availability of foreign exchange. 
